

General Bias and Catholic Identity

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In what follows, I will argue that what there may be left of our shared sense of Gonzaga's Catholic identity, operative as a gestalt, is devolving into incoherence. Since this is in the nature of a personal statement, I want to begin in a personal way by calling on my background (suitably whitewashed), to the extent that it is relevant to the question of Catholic identity. I check "Catholic" in the box that asks for "religious preference." I have been surrounded by Jesuits my whole life. Like many American Catholics, I confess that I'm wracked with ambivalence, sometimes tormented by self-doubt, often uncertain about the teaching authority of the Church and who has it¹, too committed to John Dewey's idea of "democracy as a way of life" to be immune from the temptations of antinomian, antiauthoritarian sentiments and impulses, and often critical of the shadow-play of certain affiliations of the Church in recent decades with the politics of American fundamentalist Christianity, its characteristically American anti-intellectualism, its corresponding proclivities to violence, and its exclusivism and narrow sectarianism.

The Church I grew up in seems different in various ways from the Church today, which has led me to cultivate a kind of exilic consciousness. The theology I imbibed with mother's milk is the theology of liberation. I figure that as a matter of personal psychology I'm not in this boat alone. Many of us are confused. Some of us have just given up and gone their own way. Others have remained faithful to the questions they've asked and follow their lead; they keep pondering them like Mary, as they are underpinned by a deeper desire for fidelity. In this respect, the Church teaches the primacy of personal

¹ I had thought it was theologically orthodox to affirm a triple magisterium: the magisterium of the bishops, led by the Bishop of Rome; the magisterium of theologians; and the magisterium of the faithful. I stand to be corrected.

conscience and quotes Cardinal Newman: "conscience is the Apostolic Vicar of Christ." There is a reason for this just as incumbent as the obligation to form one's conscience in the light of Church teaching. It has to do with a Catholic construal of what it means to be free. As this gospel freedom is bedrock, so too is the distinctively Catholic construal of the relation between faith and reason, terms not merely compatible but mutually entailed by a unified, integrated view of things, as determined by the Augustinian formulation of "faith seeking understanding." Some may be more emphatic when it comes to the understanding, others more emphatic when it comes to the seeking. Still, they essentially converge on the unshakeable foundation of a sacramental conception of reality. Speaking only for myself, then, this is the heart of the matter of the meaning of being Catholic. But I would be foolish not to stand open to correction and reproof. I'm not a theologian and I'm not in consecrated life.²

As far as work is concerned, I have been honored to be a member of Gonzaga's Department of Philosophy since 1986. Except for a brief adventure at Portland State University, I am entirely Jesuit-educated. I grew up in a Jesuit parish, I went to a Jesuit prep school, and I earned my A.B. in philosophy from the Cardinal Robert Bellarmine School of Philosophy and Letters at St. Louis University, where I went on for my Ph.D. Besides Gonzaga, I've taught at St. Louis University, Seattle University, and Santa Clara. For thirteen years before it closed in 1999, I taught philosophical hermeneutics, the integration seminar, and other courses annually in St. Michael's Institute (the program of first studies for Jesuit scholastics). My personal formation is steeped in the influence of Jesuit education.

In my annual rotations now, I teach ethics, contemporary philosophy, Marxism, and American philosophy, a series of courses only obliquely related to the direct articulation of Catholic and Jesuit identity. All of my work and teaching is avowedly humanistic; still, it is a humanism saturated in Catholic and Jesuit identity. On my best days at work I begin and proceed from an Ignatian composition of place. Therefore, among the core proposals we vetted a couple of years ago, it would have been predictable

² I take this last formulation from Sister Mary Eucharista.

that I signed onto "Ignatian Integration." On our campus, typically, the writers who write about Catholic identity and the loss thereof tend to be intellectual conservatives (for lack of a better term). Some of them have been prophesying the loss of identity for two decades and longer. As a matter of stereotypes, I am not among their number, although my inner conservative is a frequent guest at the soliloquy. Otherwise, I am politically correct to the letter, my left credentials are impeccable, my concern for social justice is as passionate as anyone's, I'm as easy to read as a billboard, and were I to explain myself as "Catholic," there are some who would brand me a heretic. But sometimes these days, I feel like Rip Van Winkle waking from the long sleep. I have come to discover that it was only because I had taken the Catholic and Jesuit context of our work for granted that I authorized myself to teach a course like Marxism in the first place, or engage in a string of other extracurricular initiatives over the past thirty-four years.

Wanting always to be reflective about such choices as they fell within my scope to decide, I'd settled in on a formulation I can still live with today. I began to think of our corporate work as a "healthy-minded, Mission-centered pluralism." I take healthy-mindedness from William James (but I'll also confess that I'm "soul-sick" in James's sense or Kierkegaard's). As to "Mission-centered," it seems evident enough that its meaning is obscure and that it's in danger of becoming an empty signifier (especially in its heroic Pauline intent to be all things to all people). Finally, as to "pluralism," carried to the limit, "anything goes." But if we agree from the start that anything does not go, this premise will lead us to ask a further relevant question concerning the boundary conditions. In all admiration for Prometheus, if a healthy-minded pluralism is appropriately bound (as opposed to its jaded cousin), then the boundaries may or may not constitute a red line. In point of fact, however, there is no Gaddafi-like line in the sand; or better, the line is no more than a line in the sand because it is subject to inevitable drifts in self-understanding and to being redrawn accordingly by way of our ongoing interpretations, negotiations, and the manners in which they are implemented. As Bernard Lonergan might say,

whatever the lines are, they constitute a dynamic viewpoint on the move. To obviate misunderstandings in what I hope to say, I believe this is as it should be. In other words, I doubt that there is a single, univocal, static, and permanently definitive answer to the deep underlying question, in the absence of which our alternatives are plain enough. One alternative is inappropriate to the life of a Catholic university, no matter what else we say about it. But the other alternative sometimes seems almost hopelessly vexed. The alternative we will not accept, *de facto*, no matter how prescriptive someone might argue it is *de jure*, is based on what C.S. Peirce called "the method of authority." This is not the view that nothing is authoritative, but the view that any dogmatic imposition of how we must understand, describe, interpret, and explain ourselves will be eventually dry-docked.³ The factual point is that we're like herding cats. And Abelard and Aquinas exerted their influence despite condemnations, wherein lies a cautionary tale whose moral I think we can agree to take to heart.

Nevertheless, we can still start out from the epistemically modest premise that not anything goes. If the premise seems trivial, its further entailments and implications are consequential, of moment, and almost entirely obscure, specifically with respect to their intellectual component, which may matter hardly at all in some places but which cannot fail to pose an acute problem for a place called a university. Moreover, since our own subjectivity is invariably and necessarily involved in the search for what might possibly count as an objective meaning and possibly even the truth of the matter, unavoidably, this question of the meaning of Catholic identity at Gonzaga is fraught with obstacles, conflicts, impediments, and passions, possibly even tantamount to what Marx called a "veiled civil war." Finally, who will deny that on this discursive battleground, there are even covert ops?

Evidently, then, there's a demand for publicity, objectivity, and determination with respect to what's in and what's out. So we can also say heuristically that the answers we seek are not without conditions, the most obvious of which is their defensibility in public and to our "constituents" (the

³ I use the term "dogmatic" in its Kantian denotation, not in the sense of the branch of theology called "dogmatic," the purpose of which is to investigate Church dogma.

"stakeholders," not just the "shareholders," as business ethics has taught us to say concerning fiduciary obligations). Confronted with the inevitable specter of conflict, in the context of an overweening concern with marketing and public relations, and discovering in human nature an aversion to conflict and a tendency towards conflict-avoidance, we might be able to detect just beneath the surface of things a generalized tendency to want to drop the subject altogether and let sleeping dogs lie, or at least to wait it out until we can move on to other matters generally considered to be more productive and certainly more practical: a generalized loss of appetite, a generalized impatience, and possibly even a generalized hostility to the question's even being asked. ("Who are you to say what being 'Catholic' means? Let's just drop it.")

In contemporary American philosophy, Richard Rorty offers a means of escape by way of a notion he names "liberal irony": this is the view that since anyone's views are as equally groundless as one's own, the best attitude to take to what we believe is, well, ironic. What ought to replace the search for the truth are "edifying discourses," which is not altogether an unedifying view. Except that he draws a distinction between "private" and "public": in public, it's "science" that ought to prevail; edifications are private, since what edifies me may not edify you and it's no common ground for social solidarity or public policy. (Concerning Rorty's notion of "science," the Canadian Catholic philosopher Charles Taylor is blunt: beneath the "neo-Nietzschean" surface, he writes, lies a "barely disguised physicalism," an insight to which I would add that a physicalist metaphysics is a world removed from a sacramental conception of reality.) Rorty's appeal draws its argumentative force by way of what he takes to be the opposite: he calls it "Leninism." If we disavow the vanguard party to lead, then it might appear that our last best hope would be situated in the blandness and putative content-neutrality of a putative ideal of universal tolerance, echoing the plaintive cry of Rodney King and throwing a blanket of generalized agnosticism over the *maieusis* (principled or otherwise), in order to smother it even before the effects of a maieutic method can begin to take hold, since it's a stern and ascetic discipline. In such

a scenario, each of us would be free to do our own thing, which is not without its enduring appeal. But as to "the truth," abandon hope all ye who enter here.

Rorty's "Leninism" bears a family resemblance to Peirce's "method of authority." While Peirce's philosophy of science is infinitely preferable to logical atomism and the successor theory of physicalism, his waspish illustration of the method of authority is the medieval Church. I am personally inclined to forgive him, however, because alone among American philosophers he has a singular appreciation for scholasticism. While this is no place to debate the merits and demerits of Scotism, Peirce was perhaps the most salient and merciless critic of Cartesianism ever to set pen to paper. As a matter of his deeply considered historiography, his search for an alternative led him to reach back behind the Jesuit-educated founder of modern philosophy through a characteristically Catholic act of renewal by way of a return to the sources, returning to the Franciscan priest in order to correct the Cartesian error and make a fresh start.

I haven't intended to drop Lonergan's name into the various edifying conversations that are and are not taking place for the sake of a faux erudition. Inasmuch as the question of Catholic identity calls for interpretation, and not the interpretation of a Cartesian clear and distinct idea but of a gestalt, together with all of its preconceptual moorings and underpinnings, the Canadian Jesuit philosopher and theologian not only has something to say--as he would--but he has something to say that is especially relevant to our life at Gonzaga, through a historic connection that links him to our past and to what we really should be able to call our distinctive, living tradition. Lonergan's thought is among the concrete and particular traditionary influences that allegedly distinguish us, if not quite rising to the level of Father DeSmet and Father Cataldo.

Lonergan was a major theologian of the Second Vatican Council. In those days (when every student in the university regardless of school or major was required to minor in philosophy), the young Jesuit philosophers still lived up above Hillyard at Mount St. Michael's. Their study of philosophy at the

time, still in Latin, consisted in a manualistic Thomism. Yet among their faculty was Fr. Timothy Fallon, S.J. of the California Province, a student of Lonergan's. Fallon led what I'd like to call a "Lonergan revolution" at the Mount, catalyzing the best and the brightest like lightning. For example, among them was Fr. Peter Ely, S.J., the theologian and former Academic Vice President of Gonzaga. Like Jesuits in formation everywhere in the wake of the Council, the philosophers of the Mount came down from their hilltop to Bea House (now the Regis retirement community) in order to reestablish themselves in the midst of the modern world. Their faculty included Jesuit theologians and philosophers who had been students of Lonergan's or were followers of the new Lonerganian way of proceeding, including Fr. Bernie Tyrrell, S.J., Fr. Bill Ryan, S.J., and the late Jerry Kohls. There was an attempt in the early seventies to reorganize the curriculum of St. Michael's Institute along Lonerganian lines. There was an annual Lonergan Lecture series, where the man himself gave a lecture (I think you could probably dust it off somewhere in the Foley archives). It must be said that G.U.'s Philosophy Department at large never quite cottoned to Lonergan, a fact that remains true to this day. But my purpose is not to engage in special pleading. It is merely to suggest that Lonergan's philosophy and theology are part of Gonzaga's legacy and that Lonergan has something relevant to say to our contemporary circumstances.

Other cautions that may or may not be in order are the following. First, I do not mean to address my remarks to the level of the more or less anarchic (and vibrant) conversations that are going on among us in small groups and behind closed doors, but to the level of the good order and discipline of the corporate body as a whole in our agreed-upon self-designation as a Catholic university. Second, I am not framing an answer to the question but attempting to frame the question itself. I am confident that we would give various answers, the thoughtfulness, seriousness, sophistication, and legitimacy of which I would not have the temerity to doubt. Third, I am not naming names or searching out blame or even the material cause of our present malaise and confusion (sociological and demographic in nature). As a hylomorphist, my question concerns the substantial form of the matter, rather than its material

body (the hylomorphic unity of which does not forbid a distinction). Fourth, although my purpose is neither polemical nor apologetic, I anticipate being read in both ways; my purpose is to be helpful and constructive (*tantum quantum*), but I anticipate an opposite reception of annoyance. (After all, we're too far along in the process of outcomes assessment and core revision to acknowledge the privileged place of theology and philosophy in the curriculum of a Catholic and Jesuit university, such that even the assertion thereof is bound to sound tendentious.) Finally, however, I do mean to say that unlike a generation ago, there is no University Council on Partnership and Mission, the purpose of which was to discern how the lay faculty could inherit and appropriate the mission of the dwindling number of Jesuits who were actively teaching. These Jesuits, in turn, thought of their mission as an apostolic mandate from the Church. The question could then be formulated as follows: how many of us think of our work as fulfilling an apostolic mandate from the Church?

I am not headed towards anything as scary as a doctrinal consensus. Rather, I am taking it as a virtual fait accompli that the deep underlying question to be asked concerning Catholic identity, theological and philosophical in nature, is not being asked at the level of the institution as such, in the corporate body and community as a whole, where a general spirit of laissez-faire prevails. If this is not a fact, then I can only apologize for saying it is, recent dynamic exchanges in the *Gonzaga Bulletin* notwithstanding. Still, Prof. Eric Cunningham put the challenge this way in his recent "Letter to the Editor": "If we ignore, eliminate or misrepresent Catholic teaching--or replace Catholic doctrine with subjective interpretations in those areas of curriculum or policy we call 'Catholic'--we will be guilty not only of practicing intellectual dishonesty, but of enforcing the oppression that results when the distinctions between free and autonomous entities are blurred for the sake of political homogeneity" (November 21, 2013). According to Lonergan, *all* interpretations are "subjective," i.e. they are the work of a questioning subject, but it is only because such a subject is in principle self-transcending that the objectivity of meaning can be established. This is the objectivity in question. But what it means to call

ourselves "Catholic" can aspire to the objectivity of a comprehensive viewpoint at the level of institutional identity only if the corporate body itself is asking the relevant question, actively inspecting the relevant issues, submitting itself to serious study, and following out the leads of the further relevant questions that would inevitably arise once the institutional fuse of inquiry was lit. (I understand that "corporate bodies" do not ask questions but only persons do; but at the institutional level, persons would have to be authorized--conceivably everyone--if an institutional answer were to be sought; sought more profoundly than the bromides entailed by the "branding" of our "label.") What I think calls for an explanation, then, is why the question is not being asked on this level and in this way. My hypothesis, offered under a fallibilist constraint, is that Lonergan has an answer: what he calls the general bias of common sense makes the inquiry seem irrelevant to our everyday lives at work and institutional norms and practices. Therefore we can safely ignore it.

Of course, any abductive inference, insight, or guess at the riddle is subject to a fallibilist constraint, just for the reason that it's unconfirmed! Still, I retain the redundancy in order to underscore the affinity between Peirce's fallibilism and Lonergan's cognitional theory, neither of which, as theories of knowledge, are methods of knowing the articles of faith in the way a believer assents to them --for example, the Incarnation and the Resurrection.⁴ Rather, these bedrock Christian doctrines are known by the gift of faith and are not subject to the reasoned demonstrations of a finite, discursive intelligence. (This is as true of Catholic as of Lutheran theology, but then again the Catholic commitment to the integration of faith with reason does not affirm an identity without a difference: faith does not become human reason; it surpasses human reason.) The fallibilist constraint at work in my Lonerganian hypothesis is that it is subject to falsification by counterexamples. I've proposed that on the institutional level, we have evaded rather than sought an answer to the question of our Catholic identity (which

⁴ On the other hand, neither Peirce nor Lonergan think of the act of faith as irrational (although there may be irrational faiths). Rather, as Lonergan puts it, "faith includes objects beyond the natural reach of any finite understanding" (*Insight*, p. 725 in the Philosophical Library edition [1970]).

cannot be Catholic without regard to the life of faith, conjoint with and contextualizing our various disciplinary investigations).

Besides sending us a snapshot of the current state of the question, five opinions printed in the *Bulletin* in the Fall Semester of 2013 can also serve as a laboratory. On October 10, Jim Infantine, the president of the 1887 Trust⁵, wrote to criticize the university for ignoring the provision of John Paul II's Apostolic constitution, *Ex corde Ecclesiae* (1990) that "the university should strive to recruit and appoint Catholics as professors so that, to the extent possible, those committed to the witness of the faith will constitute a majority of the faculty. All professors are expected to be aware of and committed to the Catholic mission and identity of their institutions."

On October 17, Jordan Love, opinion editor of the *Bulletin*, fired back in an essay entitled, "A Catholic Identity Does Not Mean Exclusivity." She argued that "It is not imperative that Gonzaga keeps a majority Catholic faculty in order to honor its Catholic identity." She quoted from the (newly adopted) Mission Statement: "The Gonzaga experience fosters a mature commitment to [the] dignity of the human person, social justice, diversity, intercultural competence, global engagement, solidarity with the poor and vulnerable and care for the planet." Her point was that Gonzaga does not need a majority Catholic faculty to achieve these Mission-based ends. Moreover, she implied that the dedication to these ends is just what makes Gonzaga "Catholic." She also quoted from the Documents of the Thirty-Fourth General Congregation of the Society of Jesus: "In the context of the divisive, exploitative and conflictual roles that religions, including Christianity, have played in history, dialogue seeks to develop the unifying and liberating potential of all religions, thus showing the relevance of religion for human well being, justice, and world peace ... To be religious today is to be interreligious in the sense that a positive relationship with believers of other faiths is a requirement in a world of religious pluralism."

⁵ The 1887 Trust defines itself as "a nonprofit organization of alumni, parents and other stakeholders in the Gonzaga University community committed to preserving Gonzaga's Catholic identity" (www.1887trust.org),

On October 31, Prof. David DeWolf of the Law School fired the next round. He wrote that Jordan's piece "Sadly...reflects many misunderstandings of what it means to be a Catholic, Jesuit and humanistic university." He proceeded to summarize a longer essay he wrote for the 1887 Trust: "To summarize that essay, [Jordan's] column sets up a false conflict between GU's Catholic identity and its mission to be a Jesuit and humanistic university. The three characteristics are conjunctive, not in conflict with one another. To be Jesuit is to be more Catholic, not less. And to be humanistic is to pursue education in a particular manner, not to dilute the religious character of our mission."

Next, Prof. Kevin McCruden and Fr. Mike Cook, S.J. of Religious Studies wrote "Letters" responding to Prof. DeWolf that appeared on November 7. McCruden worked out a masterful exegesis of Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians (Chs. 12-15) on the body and its members, drawing a lesson from Paul on the authentic meaning of unity and diversity. McCruden wrote, "The key here is to realize that for Paul it is actually diversity that promotes true unity, not the other way round." By this stage of the exchange, then, the issue was framed as inclusivity *versus* exclusivity in the correct understanding of the relation between unity and diversity. Infantine and DeWolf were implicitly portrayed as "exclusivists," by contrast with a more authentic, inclusive understanding of the relation.

In the same issue, Fr. Cook adapted Avery Dulles, S.J.'s "five meanings" of the word, "Catholic," beginning with the lower-case meaning of "universal" ("catholicism" is an integral part of the meaning of "Catholicism"). Second, Ignatius of Antioch meant "a higher unity of the local churches" in their celebration of the Eucharist. Third, Iranaeus meant "true or authentic" against heresies such as Gnosticism. The fourth meaning denotes the "visible continuity historically and structurally" of "creeds, sacraments...the office of bishops" and so on. "Finally," Fr. Cook wrote, "the meaning that we normally associate with 'Catholic' is Roman Catholic governed by the Bishop of Rome and those in communion with him." "However," Fr. Cook continued, "the term is problematic because we now have not only a Western-centered Church but also churches in communion with Rome in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Given these many meanings, there can be no exclusive claim to the term." In the third millennium, he concludes, "as we strive for a higher unity that recognizes the legitimacy of diverse traditions...the path forward is one of dialogue, to learn from each other. [Thomas P. Rausch, S.J., author of *Towards a Truly Catholic Church* (2005)] proposes, as the context for a truly Catholic Church, Vatican Council II, ecumenical dialogue, and engagement with globalization. This is our context as a Catholic university."

With respect to the question of numbers initially raised by Jim Infantine, Fr. Cook essentially agrees with Jordan Love: "It is not a matter of numbers, but of personal commitments."

Last, Prof. Cunningham (quoted above) entered the fray on November 21. Responding to Dr. McCruden and Fr. Cook, he wrote that he "found their positions less than convincing." The substance of his reply pivoted on a distinction between "doctrinal Catholics" and "diversity Catholics." In at least one respect, however, I don't imagine that he would fail to agree with Fr. Cook's historical-critical approach. In searching for an authentic Catholic identity, it's not as if we're after a Platonic Idea (i.e. on the sophomore level; a caricature), satisfying a series of conditions of invariance *apart from* both the historicity of the Church and the historicity of inquiry itself. Perhaps the Nicene Creed is closest, but even if we accept an enduring legacy from the Council of Trent, for example, we should all agree that Tridentine Catholicism is not Roman Catholicism today (and the cede-vacantists have already voluntarily exempted themselves from the relevant conversations: theirs is not a Catholic identity in the meaning up for discussion now, by virtue of *not* being "in communion with Rome").

On the other hand (in consideration of Fr. Cook's reference to "a Western-centered Church"), there's something comical about the fashionableness of westerners deplored an undifferentiated fictional monolith called "the West" (as if it too were a Platonic Idea in the cartoonish sense); especially when in their majority they're breast-beating "white" people prattling on endlessly about "globalization" and "diversity" while they happily imbibe the blessings of their bourgeois affluence (in an environment it would be embarrassing to call "diverse" in the sense in which they typically mean the term); and when

the terms and relations of their critique are derived from the pedigree "western" virtues themselves of liberal tolerance and celebrating diversity. On careful reading, however, this is not Fr. Cook's view: when he mentions Africa, Asia, and Latin America, he doesn't fail to add the phrase, "in communion with Rome," whether the occupant of the Chair of St. Peter is a Pole, a German, or an Argentine; and we can predict with some confidence, I think, that sooner or later it will be an African and an Asian. After all, one result of the ignoble conquests is that Catholicism has been globalized exponentially longer than the term has been in vogue (likewise, it's been multicultural from its inception: this was the upshot of Paul winning the debate with James). No one today is in favor of the Portuguese army surrounding the people in Goa in order to enforce a mass baptism. No one today is in favor of the scandalous mission schools the intent of which was the destruction of indigenous ways of life. That Europe (and America) was "Western," but it no longer exists. That Church was sinful, but today its sins are different. Over the longer cycle, it has begun to atone for its affiliations with conquistadors and imperial power, and secular authority today is so far removed from its earlier world-historical subordination to ecclesial authority that ecclesial authority has become more or less irrelevant to its exercise (*Realpolitik*).

The reason today some of us who still call ourselves "Roman Catholic" experience the anguish we might have long since overcome is precisely because we continue to grapple with the meaning and significance of the phrase, "in communion with Rome." Fr. Cook capitalizes "Catholic" as he capitalizes "Church," indicating proper names rather than mass nouns, where the mark of proper identity is none other than the phrase in question. No one from the Board of Trustees to high-school seniors considering Gonzaga could mean something else except by virtue of dimwittedness. So again the question could be formulated as follows: what does it mean for us on the level of the institution to be "in communion with Rome"?

The paradox that calls for resolution in these five *Bulletin* opinions is that each of the authors is correct, yet they disagree. For the proper noun whose name we know but whose identity we seek, Jim

Infantine cannot be wrong to quote from *Ex corde Ecclesiae*. Prof. DeWolf is not mistaken that "to be Jesuit is to be more Catholic, not less." Jordan Love cannot be wrong to quote from the Mission Statement and the Thirty-Fourth General Congregation. Prof. McCruden and Fr. Cook are right to bring forward a "higher unity," some hallmarks of which, considering stretches of historical time long enough to accommodate the Church's glacial pace down floes that everyone already knows are wayward and uneven, are the inclusivity of what Josiah Royce, also reflecting on the body and its members, called "the Beloved Community" (the Royce whose eventual influence came to the champion of social justice, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.); its openness to its own historical development; its capacity for self-correction; and, in the longer cycle, its discernment of the signs of the times. The relevant generic term is sinfulness; generically, the specific remedies fall under the guidance of the Holy Spirit. Again, not to believe this is the same as giving up (for Catholics, it's called "falling away"). And so generically we're in the neighborhood of another category that links position and counterposition together, profounder even than communion with Rome because it gives sense to such a communion in the first place; namely, the guidance of the Holy Spirit, which it takes a Jamesian will to believe rather than discursive knowledge. (And it's a matter of some importance to carve at the right joints in order to know when this distinction is operative and when it's not.) Paul VI tacks one way, John Paul II another; Benedict XVI tacks one way, Francis tacks another. But for a believer it's not the same tacking as *Bush v. Gore*.

If each author is correct in his or her own way, yet they disagree, then I think the mistake is to frame the question in the framework of inclusivity *versus* exclusivity. Paul was not addressing *all* Corinthians, let alone all humanity; he was addressing the *Christian community* in Corinth. His address was circumscribed by a preexisting unity among the members in the way of following Jesus and in a way of imagining reality as the mystical body of Christ. Moreover, just as a binary opposition between inclusion and exclusion turns the interlocutors into ships passing in the night, so too does a one-sided emphasis on either unity or diversity. Prof. McCruden used the term "countercultural" twice in his

essay, but Apple and Google bear witness that an uncritical, unprincipled multiculturalism is not in the least countercultural. Perhaps he would accept an amendment, then, to the effect that the dialectic of unity and diversity privileges neither term against the other. I think a one-sided privileging does come out, however, in Jordan Love's potential misapplication of the Thirty-Fourth General Congregation by way of the inferences her column admits. The Congregation did emphasize interreligious dialogue among the grounding apostolic works of the Society of Jesus today. But not only is the Pope a Jesuit, the Jesuits are vowed by obedience to the Pope. The welcome call to interreligious dialogue, so vital in the face of the wars of religion today, presupposes an underlying fidelity to a singular faith-tradition. At stake today in this fidelity is a "positive relationship with believers of *other* faiths," which it deems to be "a requirement in a world of religious pluralism." But of course the other faiths themselves, i.e. world religions, many of which candidly lack a notion of "faith" in a sense analogous to the Christian one (as if there were permanent homologous features that all and only "religions" shared in common), are as dedicated to ecumenism as Catholics are (in principle), except for fundamentalist excrescences like Al Qaeda and the Westboro Baptist Church ("Fags Doom Nations," "Planes Crash, God Laughs," and "Thank God for Dead Soldiers").

So while communion with Rome and the guidance of the Holy Spirit do distinguish Catholicism, ecumenism is a generic movement as alive for Thich Nhat Hanh as for the Catholic *aggiornamento*. Likewise, an appeal to the Mission Statement can only qualify as generic as well, as alive (or not) on other campuses as Gonzaga's, secular as well as religious, in the absence of a prior grasp of the Mission itself, which it does require an Ignatian composition of place in order to understand as a gestalt on the institutional level. A decontextualization of the sources explains the breakdown of communication between ships passing in the night, which it seems to me has happened in a more or less obvious way by virtue of a failure to answer the initial question. Jim Infantine quoted from *Ex corde Ecclesiae*, arguing that the provision requiring a "majority Catholic faculty" counts as an important factor in the Catholic

identity of the university. He did not give an argument; rather, he appealed to the authority of the Apostolic constitution itself. But in the further discussion, neither were there rebuttals of *Ex corde Ecclesiae* (except in the way of a subtext). The Apostolic constitution simply dropped out of the picture, to be replaced by a misleading distinction between inclusivity and exclusivity. And the reason why the distinction is a miscue is that inclusivity is not a synonym of diversity and exclusivity is not a synonym of unity.

The 1887 Trust recently ran a five-part series on *Ex corde Ecclesiae* by Prof. Cunningham (in August and September), signifying its importance to one group of Catholics; while another group of Catholics simply ignores it. We know that its provisions will not be imposed by the method of authority or by fiat, and many of us, Catholic or not, are convinced that they should not be implemented at all, by any method. By appearances, at the institutional level, the decision has already been made to ignore or evade it (possibly by Hannah Arendt's "Rule of Nobody," the worst-case scenario of an all-pervasive bureaucratic rationality). What if the President were to convene a faculty-wide plenum for the occasion of its twenty-fifth anniversary in 2015? My guess would be that it would be about as welcome as the charettes of yesteryear. Yet the worst-case scenario of our present malaise seems to be our indistinguishability from Ben & Jerry's, with the like sentiment of mission, the like ecumenism, the like vocabulary of diversity, and the like underlying conception of social justice ("good" capitalism *versus* "bad" capitalism, charity and volunteer service *versus*...nobody).

Under the cover of American law, there are local historical reasons for our institutional neglect of *Ex corde Ecclesiae* rooted in another of its provisions, requiring a *mandatum* for professors who teach Catholic theology. Those of us who were around in those days will recall the firestorm. A counteroffensive was led by members of the Department of Religious Studies. The atmospherics were like Second Manassas. Back then, I thought the Yankees won. The issue was couched in the diction of academic freedom, which I am as unequivocally for now as I was then. But once again speaking only for

myself, it wasn't until the blessed trinity of publicists for militant atheism, the late Christopher Hitchens, Sam Harris, and Richard Dawkins, achieved their cultural (not countercultural) cachet, that it came home to me momentously that there was a difference in kind between one kind of grounding for academic freedom and another, one grounded in the Catholic intellectual tradition and the other grounded in the flattery of the age. This difference also gives rise to the further question of what is countercultural about Gonzaga. The University of Central America in the San Salvador of the eighties was countercultural, but it seems reasonably clear that Gonzaga is not the UCA. What then is it that makes our institutional Catholic identity a countercultural one?

My aim in invoking *Ex corde Ecclesiae* is not to argue for its implementation but to observe the manner in which it has been ignored. The parties who opposed its implementation in the civil war over the *mandatum* (myself included) thought of their adversaries as mounting a rearguard action. In remembrance of the hard-fought and painful struggles endured by the founders of Gender and Women's Studies and the struggles that eventuated over time in the Unity Multicultural Education Center, the chariness many of us spontaneously feel when we come into the vicinity of the word "Catholic" is understandable enough. We see why *Ex corde Ecclesiae* and *Fides et ratio* are not the first items on our public agenda. The landscape is littered with personal injuries. No wonder it takes courage to raise the question. No wonder there are so many strategies of evasion. No wonder the search for genuine answers is so fraught with hardship and peril. In those days, the former president of the university, Fr. Robert Spitzer, S.J., had hoped that he could persuade us to adopt a "faith statement" of some sort. I recall a meeting in the Wolff Auditorium when I asked Fr. Spitzer whether he intended to make Gonzaga more like the Franciscan University of Steubenville (whose website identifies it as "passionately Catholic"). He answered without hesitation that it wasn't. I didn't realize until after the fact that he took offense at the question. I take this context to be with us still.

Past the theatrics of the dramatic pattern of experience, a hermeneutics of suspicion might lead us to suspect that what I've recounted here is really a sideshow. The President will not convene a faculty plenum for 2015. The Academic Vice President will not enjoin us to a more faithful witness to our Catholic identity and mission (a "Moment for Mission" showing up in our inbox notwithstanding). It's hard to imagine how the memorandum would be written without being read as a *causus belli*. But the deeper reasons are impersonal, not on account of malevolence, bad faith, or ill will. I think they reflect some characteristic features of the nature of administrative-bureaucratic rationality, which are related to the sedimentations of the general bias of common sense. In terms of general bias, it is hard to see how the question of Catholic identity is relevant to the work we actually do in teaching chemistry or accounting.

In *Insight*, Lonergan develops an account of common sense as a specialized form of intelligence. It specializes in the particular and the concrete. It's a blessing for sure, but it's not without a curse. Its virtue is its vice: it solves problems that bedevil particular, concrete circumstances, but circumstances change and the insights that were relevant once are no longer relevant then. Without the corrections of disinterested inquiry, common sense is therefore likely to go off course. Because it is not self-correcting, blind spots, omissions, and distortions creep in. Lonergan attributes these to bias: individual bias, group bias, and the general bias to which an uncorrected common sense, incapable of criticizing itself, is liable.

If we were to stop our investigations once we achieved particular, concrete solutions to particular, concrete problems, a self-correcting, self-developing intelligence would then be short-circuited. To the "apparently hardheaded practicality and realism" of common sense, the further questions relevant to eggheads (that is, "on the level of scientific and philosophic thought") appear useless and pointless. But there are implications for the long run. As intelligence spontaneously develops by way of questioning things, it moves from less comprehensive to more comprehensive viewpoints. But when disinterested inquiry fails to play its corrective part, a "longer cycle of decline"

comes to pass through a succession of viewpoints "ever less comprehensive." This follows for common sense from its exclusive emphasis on what's immediate and expedient. But with such an exclusive emphasis on immediacy and expediency in command, the situation (whatever it may be) becomes less and less intelligible. Lonergan writes, "In the limit, the only discernible intelligibility in the objective facts is [a power struggle]." He calls this breakdown in the ability of common sense to explain itself and its corresponding relapse to a power struggle "the social surd." If the last word is a struggle for power, then people "of practical common sense become warped by the situation in which they live, and regard as starry-eyed idealism and silly unpracticality any proposal that would lay the axe to the root of the social surd." The "rejection of the normative significance of detached and disinterested intelligence makes [common sense] radically uncritical." The upshot, Lonergan writes, is the "major surrender of intellectual detachment that the succession of ever less comprehensive viewpoints [entails]."

It turns out that Lonergan also thought that "being is completely intelligible." To perhaps a majority of our contemporaries, this notion appears wildly implausible. Then again, it's been Lonergan's fate mainly to be ignored. Although his notion of the complete intelligibility of being is entirely consonant with the Catholic intellectual tradition in its construal of the relation between faith and understanding, the way he writes sometimes doesn't necessarily help his cause. Sometimes he sounds as if his argument is: people are ignoring me, therefore society is in decline. But Marshall McLuhan, an icon of modern theories of communication, hasn't been ignored, and it happens that he's a Catholic too. On being a Catholic, he said this: "One of the advantages of being a Catholic is that it confers a complete intellectual freedom to examine any and all phenomena with the absolute assurance of their intelligibility."⁶ As far as being a Catholic goes, his statement is correct; one Canadian Catholic corroborates another.

⁶ I owe this reference to Eric Cunningham, who retrieved it from "Divine Inspiration: How Catholicism made Marshall McLuhan one of the twentieth century's freest and finest thinkers," by Jeet Heer, in *The Walrus* (July/August, 2011).

It can be argued that the general bias of common sense has set in at Gonzaga, together with its implications for a longer cycle of decline. Such an argument would be predicated on the breakdown in the intelligibility of the meaning of its Catholic identity: who knows what it means? In the limit, as Lonergan put it, society would have no need of the university. That is, not only would it have no need of theology, philosophy, the humanities, and the arts pursued for their own sake (as a necessary component of the rumor afoot that we "educate the whole person"), but it would have no need of mathematics and the sciences as well, except for their immediate relevance to technical and commercial applications.

Since I'm a philosopher, I don't have data, but I do have anecdotes. When anecdotes are told in good faith, they reflect a person's genuine lived experience. The sign of their confirmation is that they ring true. Whether they ring true or false, however, is a question that calls for further inquiry and investigation. Still, they cannot be dismissed *überhaupt* as epistemically worthless sources of knowledge. Here everything depends on the insight or oversight. Perhaps all one can say phenomenologically is that one has or fails to have it. When an impasse occurs, the demand for further investigation is relentless. So now I will relay some anecdotes told to me in private conversation that ring true.

One friend told me that in a conversation with another faculty member as they walked away from one of the endless meetings, the question came up: why are you here? It's true that this question could be asked in the spirit of an inquisition, but my friend was sincere and the question came up naturally enough because they'd been talking about Catholic identity. In the end, the other party answered, "Because they offered me the job." This answer is good as far as it goes; it's the "hardheaded practicality" of the situation we're in. Offers are scarce, but it could have been Eastern (a good university that happens to be neither Catholic nor Jesuit). So the trouble is that as an answer, it isn't good enough. If Catholic identity belongs to the corporate body as such, as an institution and as a

community, and if what's called for is a public ratification, at least by way of conversational implicature if not deductive logic, then everyone in the employment of the university stands in some relation to it. Lonergan's recommendation is to adopt the "transcendental precepts" (from *Method in Theology*) available to any intelligent person without specialized training: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible. If the call to responsibility is immanent in the operations of intelligence as a native endowment of the animal, then each of us has some measure of responsibility to the question at hand, and not just the Catholics alone, since the sign on the door used to say, "All are welcome here." At the entry level, this amounts at least to paying attention. The promised land implicit in the act of paying attention as the conjoint act of the corporate body is the prospect of what the Jesuits call a "unity of hearts and minds" (and what Hans-Georg Gadamer calls a "fusion of horizons"). But the presupposition of a discursive fusion is the willingness to undertake the dialogue. The word is sweet. The practice is difficult and painful.

Another friend told me about a different answer: Gonzaga is Catholic because Catholicism is "adjacent" to it. This answer seems good too as far as it goes: there's a chapel that offers conveniently located daily mass, there's campus ministry, there are crucifixes on the walls of the classrooms, there's a beautiful new grotto of Our Lady, there's a retreat program, there's a University Vice President for Mission, and so forth. Sarcasm would be unworthy: these signs, including the university logo itself, do in fact signify Catholicism. But the adjacency of Catholicism to the university is also not a good enough answer when it comes to the heart of the matter.

Another friend told me about a third answer to the meaning of our being a Catholic and Jesuit institution; namely, that it is a "heritage." On being pressed, a distinction was drawn between a "heritage" and a "living tradition." Once the distinction came into play, the conversationalist turned out to mean the past tense, a synonym of "bygone," like an artifact in the Rare Books Room at Foley. Since the past has its admirable qualities, everyone with a curator's heart is free to admire them in their

pleasing aesthetic way. It's a beautiful heritage, we can all agree, and it's a better way of living if the aesthetic pattern of experience enriches all of our lives. But then we'll go to the beautiful chapel in College Hall as tourists, and tourism also isn't a good enough answer to the question of conserving our institutional Catholic identity, especially considering that the remembrance of things past can have a profound effect on the present if we let in the light.

The general reason why these answers don't come to the heart of the matter is that they are distant, not from what the "intellectual conservatives" say, but from what all of us say more or less in unison concerning the internal relations that bind us together: the diction of "educating the whole person, body, mind, and spirit"; "the care of the person" (which we often say in Latin); cultivating, appreciating, and honoring "diversity" in a "globalized world"; and "social justice." Before we take each in turn, I will go on record to say that I'm in favor of all of these slogans. My point will be that we may be coherent to ourselves individually when we say such things--we know "in private" what we mean by them-- but on the institutional level and corporately considered, there's an institutional incoherence attributable to the settling-in of the general bias of common sense. I will close merely by offering some rough indications, each of which it would be appropriate to develop in a sustained way.

So let's come to the heart of the matter in what we say about who we are. For example, the diction of the whole person is a cliché that borders on meaninglessness if we don't know who the whole person is. Lonergan concludes his presentation of common sense with an allusion to the tower of Babel. We say that we educate the whole person in body, mind, and spirit. With respect to the terms and relations of this formulation, what does it mean? As a corporate body, what is our philosophy of mind? Worse still, considering the ubiquity and also the importance of cognitive science, what is our philosophy of spirit? My point is not to answer such questions but to observe that *as a corporate body* we don't ask them. It would probably be inexpedient to ask them in an intellectually serious way.

Besides, someone will say, their meaning is obvious (when it isn't). The dismissive gesture characteristic of the general bias comes next: why make a mountain out of a molehill?

Next, we say that our charism is the care of the person. But what is a person? We can give any answer we like, but with respect to our corporate identity as Catholic, can many of us say that we know what this means, besides "superior customer service," as an "outcome" of our sustained study of Ignatian spirituality in its historical roots and contemporary interpretations? Or what it means with respect to a philosophy that takes an American, a French, a Scottish, a Polish and other forms? It's not to the point to observe that we have specialists on our campus whose task it is to know these things, or that more or less randomly individuals decide to take up the Spiritual Exercises, because consigning this knowledge to experts and random individuals falls massively short of an answer to an *institutional* question (and a question about the basic character of our community). Are we religiously, theologically, and philosophically personalists? If we're not, then presumably we have some other answer on offer.

So what is it?

For example, is the care of the person consistent with transhumanism? But transhumanism is here and on its way. Is the care of the person consistent with the Google engineer and futurist Ray Kurzweil's forecast of a "technological singularity" (based on an extension of "Moore's law") scheduled to occur around 2045, by which time he predicts that "the pace of change will be so astonishingly quick that we won't be able to keep up, unless we enhance our own intelligence by merging with the intelligent machines we are creating"? Would it be our mission to hasten this day of splendor and glory, merely to descry it, or to criticize, repudiate, and if possible to reverse it? Is there a "design flaw" in human biology that nanotechnology holds out the prospect of correcting? Is it the utopian or the dystopian imagination at work? (But everybody know that the real question is: are there grants?) I've brought up a serious subject that I am unable to treat in a serious way in this context. I mean only that there's something important at stake in what we take a person to be, such that the care of the person is

an empty signifier in the absence of some account; and that the account, which credits such terms as "respect" and "dignity," must have some relation to the specifically Catholic milieu in which all of us from computer scientists to litterateurs are compelled to think about these things.

There are other things we say (in public, to our "constituents") about who we are that may seem more determinate but that might be false or vapid or else involve a bait-and-switch maneuver. For example, we say that we are about diversity in a globalized world, but if we say this, we should also carefully study the aerial photograph (digitally down to the pixel). If we then correct ourselves and say this aspirationally rather than indicatively, well then so does General Electric. So what is the meaning of diversity? What are the implications of globalization? And globalization of what? These questions are generically important: what then constitutes the specific difference of asking them in the milieu of a Catholic university? In other words, it's an exercise in the obvious to notice that *every* institution of higher education is about diversity in a globalized world, as is every corporate organization except for some ranches in Wyoming.

Finally, we say that we are about social justice and that this is what distinguishes us as Catholic and Jesuit (though in fact it doesn't, since virtually the same diction is in play at Evergreen). But if we were to press the point, then how would we link up with the social teaching of the Catholic Church--institutionally and as a corporate body--or with the point of departure of this idiom in the Thirty-Second General Congregation of the Society of Jesus? Or does it even matter whether we draw such links or fail to draw them? On the other hand, if we don't link up in this way, then what we mean by social justice *per se* is indifferent to Catholic and Jesuit signifiers, and then when we name ourselves Catholic on this basis, the bait-and-switch maneuver has succeeded.

Part of the trouble is the trouble with Catholics themselves when they are asked to say what they mean. But Catholics will continue to have their intramural fistfights whether Gonzaga conserves its Catholic identity or calls it a "heritage" instead. On a university campus, conversation sublimates the

violence of the streets; the fine art of pugilism achieves the level of a militantly nonviolent discursive practice; real dialogue occurs; a higher viewpoint appears. But when it comes to the Catholic identity of Gonzaga and the general aversion to talking about it (too much), Lonergan's allusion to Babel is apt. In the corporate body, the general bias prevails. We can't say or we don't know what we mean by "Catholic" in a way that gains institutional purchase beyond small coteries, cliques, and factions.

The point is that if "Catholic identity" devolves into marketing slogans and public-relations strategies, but by design we obscure its meaning or can't answer the question coherently as a corporate body, sooner or later someone is going to say that we reek of inauthenticity. As a pluralist, my own purpose is not to answer the question but to ask it. Since the answer isn't clear, the question deserves study. It deserves study not by this or that individual according to whim, departmental designation, or committee assignment, but by everyone who works here. Dozens will answer that they couldn't care less. Then again, the point is that this is what they will say.

Tom Jeannot

November 29, 2013

Eric Cunningham (Bulletin, 11/21/13)

It was gratifying to see several responses two weeks ago in the Bulletin to the questions of GU's Catholic identity that were raised by Dr. David DeWolf (and indirectly, by me) in prior issues. As someone who has been involved with these discussions for several years now, I'm always encouraged when colleagues of good will seriously engage these "mission-critical" matters. So, I would like to express my gratitude to Fr. Mike Cook, S.J., and Dr. Kevin McCruden, both of the Religious Studies Department, for weighing in, even if I found their positions less than convincing.

I wonder sometimes if "doctrinal Catholics" like myself and Dr. DeWolf, and "diversity Catholics" like Fr. Cook and Dr. McCruden (frankly I have no idea if my friend Dr. McCruden is a professing Catholic or not, but by the characterization of "Catholic" that he and Fr. Cook have provided, I don't think he would take offense at being called one) are just talking past each other.

At the core of the discussion are questions over what it means to be Catholic and what it means to embrace diversity.

In general, doctrinal Catholics maintain — using evidence found in Church instructions — that GU is failing to promote the kind of Catholic culture and curriculum that it should, according to the Church's own definition of what a Catholic university should be. Diversity Catholics maintain that doctrinal Catholicism lacks diversity, and that GU is either 1) just fine the way it is, or 2) needs more diversity in order to be more Catholic. In any event, diversity Catholics tend to operate under the assumption that everything GU does is Catholic, simply by virtue of its "Catholic

identity.” Doctrinal Catholics contest this by pointing out that many of the things we do here with respect to curriculum offerings, speaker selection and student activities either contradict or ignore official and universally understood Catholic teaching.

Since there seems to be no satisfactory way to resolve this debate, it may be time to try a new tack.

What if we said that if GU fails to preserve a space for the flourishing of doctrinal Catholicism, it will be in violation of every good tenet of diversity politics known to the multicultural world? It seems to me that if an institution wants to preserve an authentically diverse environment, it has to promote a multiplicity of authentic cultures — doctrinal Catholicism included.

Cardinal Avery Dulles, whom Fr. Cook cites, was correct in pointing out that there exists a variety of understandings of the word Catholic, but as Fr. Cook also notes, not all of them relate to that particular mode of Catholicism (the historical Roman Catholic Church in communion with the pope) upon which GU was actually founded, and from which it still derives its legitimacy as a “Catholic” institution.

As a modern university, we are empowered and entitled to teach all kinds of fine things. As a Catholic university we are morally and intellectually obligated to teach and promote the Catholic faith, objectively — as defined in the Catechism of the Catholic faith — and authorized by the Roman Magisterium. We are not obligated to promote the Catholic faith to the exclusion of all other things in the world, but as the context and ground of every discipline that we teach in the university. The day we cease to do that — and I would say that day is demonstrably past — we are no longer a Catholic university by any objective standard that the Catholic Church recognizes in defining its universities. If we wish to be a diverse university, we will need to be as meticulous and accurate in our teaching of Catholic liturgy and theology as we are in our teaching of economics, Islam, physics, feminism, mathematics, Buddhism, Marxism, psychology and every other domain of knowledge that possesses a knowable history and identifiable parameters.

If we ignore, eliminate or misrepresent Catholic teaching — or replace Catholic doctrine with subjective interpretations in those areas of curriculum or policy that we call “Catholic” — we will be guilty not only of practicing intellectual dishonesty, but of enforcing the oppression that results when the distinctions between free and autonomous entities are blurred for the sake of political homogeneity. We would not insult a Muslim in our community by suggesting that because Catholics and Muslims worship the same God, and “submit” to God’s will, that Islam and Catholicism are really the same thing.

If our respect for diversity is sincere, we will be careful not to insult Catholics by succumbing to the all-too-present temptation of conflating Catholicism with the cultural assumptions of secular progressive materialism.

So, for the sake of diversity, and giving due respect to the Catholic minority at GU, let us commit ourselves to an honest and appreciative representation of Catholic theology and practices.

Fr. Mike Cook, SJ (Bulletin, 11/7/13)

For many years I have taught a course at GU entitled “Christian Doctrine” (RELI 210). In the first class, I have always given an historical account of what it means to be Jesuit (since I am a living example of one). Then I develop the meanings of the word “Catholic” based on Avery Dulles, S.J., *The Catholicity of the Church* (Oxford lectures, 1985). To cite my syllabus: “A fundamental conviction underlying the whole course is the inseparable connection between the human, the religious, and the Christian so that the truth of religious and Christian claims never denies or invalidates the authentically human.” The mission of Gonzaga is to foster the fullness of human life that is true and authentic.

Given recent uses of the word “Catholic”, I would like to focus here on Dulles’ five meanings with some adaptations. The first is universal, rooted in cosmic nature, that gives the broadest possible extent to the term, but the other meanings focus on the historical development of the term. The second is based on the earliest use from Ignatius, Bishop of Antioch (d. 110) in his letter to the Smyrneans. Ignatius, while recognizing the legitimacy of local churches around Antioch, wanted the churches to come together at the Eucharistic altar to celebrate a higher unity. The Greek word comes from *kata* (according to) and *holos* (the whole). The image of “whole” recognizes individual parts.

I interpret this to mean unity within legitimate diversity. The operative term is legitimate. Hence, the third meaning is true, or authentic, as contrasted with false or heretical. In the middle of the second century, the Church was confronted with positions that needed to be clarified, e.g. Gnosticism against which Irenaeus (d. 200) wrote five volumes. The Church must always discern what counts as true doctrine. The fourth meaning refers to those churches that emphasize visible continuity historically and structurally, e.g. creeds, sacraments and the office of bishops.

We have Orthodox Catholics, Roman Catholics and Anglican Catholics. The opposite would be free, charismatic churches since the Reformers, especially Luther and Calvin, considered themselves to be developing a true reform of the Church. Finally, the meaning that we normally associate with "Catholic" is Roman Catholic governed by the Bishop of Rome and those in communion with him. However, the term is problematic because we now have not only a Western-centered Church but also churches in communion with Rome in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Given these many meanings, there can be no exclusive claim to the term.

Thomas P. Rausch, S.J., the author of *Towards A Truly Catholic Church* (2005), writes an ecclesiology for the third millennium. The first was marked principally by the unity of the faith despite all the controversies; the second by division principally between East and West (1054) and between Catholic and Protestant (1517). At the beginning of the third (March, 2000), John Paul II asked forgiveness for past sins.

We all need forgiveness and reconciliation as we strive for a higher unity that recognizes the legitimacy of diverse traditions. History cannot be reversed, so the path forward is one of dialogue, to learn from each other.

Rausch proposes, as the context for a truly Catholic Church, Vatican Council II, ecumenical dialogue, and engagement with globalization. This is our context as a Catholic university.

Thus, according to Pope Francis, we cannot be a single-issue Church. As important as issues of sexual morality are, we must broaden our vision to include everyone, especially the poor and marginalized. When we hire someone, whether faculty or staff, we need to know two things: whether a person is competent in a particular field and whether he or she is comfortable with the vision and values of our mission statement. We ask them to affirm a tradition of Jesuit education, a tradition of Christian self-definition and a tradition of service to the poor and oppressed. It is not a matter of numbers, but of personal commitments.

I wonder if those who insist on a Catholic majority would also want to eliminate the word Jesuit since there are so few of us left. Any form of sectarianism, exclusivism and authoritarianism is, in effect, anti-Catholic.

If we are not open to the other, in his or her unique dignity and integrity, and seek open and honest dialogue with all people, we are neither Catholic nor a university. The appeal to "religious liberty" is falsely directed if it is a cover to attain the objectives of a particular group.

Religious liberty is a matter of conscience based on the personal responsibility of anyone who has to make a moral decision. The Catholic tradition, especially in its social teaching, respects the primacy of conscience and so does Gonzaga University.

Michael L. Cook, S.J., is professor emeritus in the religious studies department.

Kevin McCruden (Bulletin, 11/7/13)

In a recent letter to the editor, Prof. David De Wolf provides a summary of his more extensive reflections posted on the website of the 1887 Trust where he expressed several misgivings about a column that appeared in the October 17 edition of the Gonzaga Bulletin entitled, "A Catholic Identity Does Not Mean Exclusivity."

In both pieces Prof. De Wolf challenges what he sees as a misguided emphasis placed on the value of diversity which calls into question the Catholic identity of Gonzaga University.

In particular, he notes in the 1887 Trust document: "... a university that is more Catholic, more united in its central mission, will naturally result in more diversity in every other category.

But it will be a true diversity, as described in 1 Corinthians 12, wherein St. Paul reminds us that there is a diversity of gifts, but one Spirit. It does not mean the politically correct version of diversity in which there are multiple appearances, but an unforgiving uniformity of thought."

In referencing the writings of the Apostle Paul, Prof. De Wolf seeks to support his contention that adherence to a unified mission actually serves to cultivate authentic, as opposed to inauthentic, diversity.

As someone who regularly teaches New Testament at GU, I would like to offer my own reflections on the way Paul thinks theologically about the issue of diversity.

It is crucial to place 1 Corinthians 12 into its larger interpretive context. Throughout chapters 12-15 of this letter, Paul is actually addressing a very concrete problem. Paul has become aware that certain members of the community are placing too high a premium on the gift of inspired speech, namely: the gift of tongues.

Paul is also aware that some are using this gift as a way of imposing within the community a clear social hierarchy where tongue speakers possess the status of a superior class of believers as compared to other members of the community who evidently display more modest spiritual gifts.

Evidence for such hierarchical thinking is clearly visible behind 1 Corinthians 12: 21, where Paul employs the image of the human body in order to shame the persons who are behaving in this manner: "The eye cannot say to the hand, 'I have no need of you,' nor again the head to the feet, 'I have no need of you.' "

Such divisive behavior among the Corinthians likely also explains why Paul will consistently place the gift of tongues last whenever he enumerates the numerous gifts that are powerfully on display in the community.

The crucial thing to see here is the following: by elevating inspired speech to the supreme expression of Christian existence, the Corinthian Christians are actually promoting a shared, highly unified vision of a distinctive identity. In this case the distinctive identity involves the conviction that inspired speech alone captures what it means to live authentically in the Spirit.

Paul challenges this view by putting forward his famous metaphor of the body, a metaphor which has the principal function to celebrate the diversity of the many gifted members who together comprise the Corinthian community. The key here is to realize that for Paul it is actually diversity that promotes true unity, not the other way round. By noting that “there are varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit” (1 Cor 12:4), Paul wishes to emphasize not a unified or common mission as Prof. De Wolf implies, but instead the insight that the diversity of spiritual gifts present in the Corinthian community is derived from the same divine source.

The unity envisioned by Paul is, in other words, the unity of a common life where the value of diversity is prized above all else.

A further implication of Paul’s thinking is that diversity is itself a theological category that demands continual and self-conscious behavioral embodiment in the community since it is deeply counter-cultural.

It is apparently much easier and more natural for communities to gather around a common cause or mission, and in the name of defending that mission to either intentionally or unintentionally exclude others: “Because I am not a hand, I do not belong to the body...Because I am not an eye, I do not belong to the body” (1 Cor 12:15-16). This is precisely what some of the Corinthians did when they lifted up inspired speech as a kind of unified marker of authentic Christian identity.

While I applaud Prof. De Wolf’s call to reflect critically and thoughtfully on what it means for GU to be a Jesuit, Catholic, and humanistic institution, I propose that we consider thinking of GU’s common mission and identity in another manner.

Might we think of our mission less as a matter of adherence to some kind of propositional identity that links Catholic identity primarily to a matter of assent to official pronouncements and more to an understanding of mission as emphasizing a shared common life as described above? The latter is clearly evident in the writings of the Apostle Paul, who advocated diversity not in an attempt to be democratic or broad minded, but because he saw that true diversity is emblematic of the counter-cultural nature of the kingdom of God embodied by Jesus.

David DeWolf (10/31/13)

A recent column in the Gonzaga Bulletin (“A Catholic Identity Does Not Mean Exclusivity”) attempted to address the concern raised in a letter to the editor by Jim Infantine (Oct. 10).

Infantine’s letter questioned whether Gonzaga was committed to compliance with one of the norms specified in *Ex corde ecclesiae* (John Paul II’s letter on Catholic universities), namely that non-Catholics not be permitted to become a majority of the faculty.

The column does a very good job of reflecting the thinking of many faculty and many administrators at GU. Sadly, it also reflects many misunderstandings of what it means to be a Catholic, Jesuit and humanistic university. I have more exhaustively detailed those misunderstandings in an essay posted on the website of the 1887 Trust (1887trust.org).

To summarize that essay, the column sets up a false conflict between GU’s Catholic identity and its mission to be a Jesuit and humanistic university. The three characteristics are conjunctive, not in conflict with one another. To be Jesuit is to be more Catholic, not less. And to be humanistic is to pursue education in a particular manner, not to dilute the religious character of our mission.

The column justifies the rejection of the Norm by appealing to the value of diversity. But there is a simple analogy to illustrate why “diversity” in faculty hiring is not an excuse for failing to preserve GU’s Catholic identity.

If you run a Chinese restaurant, you need to pay attention to whether the people who work there are committed to its distinctive identity. If the cooks you hire are only committed to “culinary excellence,” and expect the freedom to put tacos, cheeseburgers and meatloaf on the menu, then you run the risk of losing your claim to be a Chinese restaurant.

Another argument raised in the column is that hiring more Catholic faculty would limit GU’s appeal to students who are not Catholic (now a majority of the student body). Here again, by way of analogy, you aren’t likely to appeal to a broader customer base by adding tacos, cheeseburgers and meatloaf to the menu of a Chinese restaurant.

Most people who eat at Chinese restaurants (at least in Spokane) are neither ethnically Chinese nor interested in emigrating to China. While they expect to get a fork and knife if they ask for them, and a menu in a language they can understand, they don’t feel offended if the restaurant has an atmosphere quite different from Denny’s. In fact, if all

they get is the Denny's menu with a few Chinese characters thrown in, they would wonder why the restaurant advertised itself as a Chinese restaurant.

Following this analogy, the column treats the current practice at GU — to use hiring criteria indistinguishable from those that would be found at Eastern Washington University, Duke or the vast majority of American universities — as a virtue, failing to explain how, if we follow this path, Gonzaga will maintain an identity distinct from those other institutions.

Another argument made in the column is that “GU’s Catholic identity is enveloped within the Jesuit humanistic mission.” Despite protestations to the contrary, this approach treats the three descriptors of GU (Jesuit, Catholic, humanistic) as though they were in competition with one another, and we would have to “pick and choose” which one(s) to subordinate to the other(s).

In fact, as my more extensive essay explains, nothing about being Jesuit and humanistic diminishes the obligation to be fully Catholic, even while we strive as a Catholic university to be a welcoming and attractive place for people with diverse backgrounds. Rather than limiting diversity, a vibrant Catholic identity is likely to attract the widest variety in terms of nationality, race, gender, income, etc.

If we excuse our abandonment of a robust Catholic identity by claiming a devotion to “diversity,” we are likely to achieve just the opposite — we will become just another American university, appealing to the same students and offering the same educational menu.

Many universities have made the journey from a founding religious tradition toward generic academia. Yale was once Congregationalist; Duke was once Methodist. If this is a future Gonzaga wishes to avoid, that aspiration needs to be translated into its hiring policy.

David K. DeWolf is professor of law at Gonzaga Law School.

Jordan Love (10/17/13)

It is not imperative that Gonzaga keeps a majority Catholic faculty in order to honor its Catholic identity. It is important to note that GU’s Catholic identity is enveloped within the Jesuit humanistic mission.

Part of the university’s mission statement firmly states, “The Gonzaga experience fosters a mature commitment to dignity of the human person, social justice, diversity, intercultural competence, global engagement, solidarity with the poor and vulnerable and care for the planet.”

How can we claim to genuinely live out our mission as well as actively engage in its implementation if we pick and choose which parts to honor?

Establishing a quota that puts a cap on the number of non-Catholic faculty members who may bring their talents to the GU community seems to counter what the university prides itself on.

Should we therefore put limitations on how much diversity we are willing to accept? Should we aim for the bare minimum level of intercultural competence? Should we commit ourselves to honoring all human dignities or designate a select few that we deem worthy of acceptance and respect?

Just as GU’s faculty may not be composed of a Catholic majority, neither is its student population. GU is not restricted to Catholic students nor students who attended a Catholic high school.

There are more than 20 faiths represented on campus, according to the “Religious Distribution” section of the university website’s GU Facts & Figures. Requiring a Catholic majority of faculty members could limit conversation surrounding the role of faith in everyday life and/or hinder the development of spirituality in students of other faith traditions; it would produce one dominant perspective.

A Jesuit education assigns great value to the ability to both reflect and think critically about the information that bombards the senses on a daily basis.

I took Dr. John Sheveland’s course in Interreligious Dialogue last year and he based his course upon a quote by the Society of Jesus, General Congregation 34 in 1995: “In the context of the divisive, exploitative and conflictual roles that religions, including Christianity, have played in history, dialogue seeks to develop the unifying and liberating potential of all religions, thus showing the relevance of religion for human well being, justice, and world peace ... To be religious today is to be interreligious in the sense that a positive relationship with believers of other faiths is a requirement in a world of religious pluralism.”

It is important to be exposed to other teachings. To successfully educate the whole person, a university must be dedicated to incorporating many different voices and perspectives. For the individual to strengthen his or her own faith, one must seek to understand the belief systems of others as a way to bridge commonalities that extend across humanity as well as working toward a foundation of respect within human difference.

University Ministry provides support for all faith traditions and is inclusive of many faith backgrounds within its organized programs. UMIN retreats have a high student participation rate because of their inclusivity.

A large part of the Catholic faith is dependent upon the concept of social justice and showing mercy to the poor and the vulnerable. In 2013, the Peace Corps announced that GU held the No. 1 spot in the small, undergraduate school category for the 2013 Top Colleges rankings for producing Peace Corps volunteers.

Many other GU grads dedicate time and energy to organizations like Jesuit Volunteer Corps (JVC), Teach for America, AmeriCorps and the Inner-City Teaching Corps. Without a majority Catholic faculty, students are still being called to serve others on a large scale. Many GU alumni are choosing to dedicate their lives to social justice. CCASL programs and service-learning requirements in classrooms also implement Catholic teachings in a practical and altruistic way.

GU should hire faculty who have respectable credentials, honorable talents, who are active participants in the community, who encourage academic excellence, who value advocating for social justice and who are dedicated to educating young men and women for others.

These requirements will make a difference in the lives of students. Individuals who meet these expectations will help in producing a generation of young people who are aware, actively engaged and unquestioningly merciful. They will help produce young people who strive for individual success while also desiring to contribute to the greater common good.

Bulletin Opinion Editor

Jim Infantine (10/10/13)

In its Statement of Affirmation, Gonzaga University acknowledges that the Apostolic Constitution of John Paul II, "Ex Corde Ecclesiae," "...identifies the core purpose of the university as the pursuit of truth..." and that "the fundamental dynamic set up by Ex Corde Ecclesiae is one that seeks to understand how a Catholic university differs in its educational program from that of a secular university."

Why then, does GU's administration appear to be ignoring a key component of Ex Corde Ecclesiae; namely, the directive that there be a majority Catholic faculty employed by the University?

Who teaches at a Catholic university is critical to the issue of who will take responsibility for the school's Catholic identity and mission. This is not to say that non-Catholics cannot contribute to that mission – many non-Catholics are supportive of the Catholic mission and can contribute to its realization.

Nonetheless, it is prudent to recognize, with Ex Corde, that, as a practical matter, the perpetuation of a strong Catholic identity is safeguarded by a majority Catholic faculty.

The American bishops agree with Pope John Paul II's analysis, which is why, when they issued The Application of Ex Corde Ecclesiae for the United States in 1999, they had this to say about faculty hiring:

"In accordance with its procedures for the hiring and retention of professionally qualified faculty and relevant provisions of applicable federal and state law, regulations and procedures, the university should strive to recruit and appoint Catholics as professors so that, to the extent possible, those committed to the witness of the faith will constitute a majority of the faculty. All professors are expected to be aware of and committed to the Catholic mission and identity of their institutions."

Currently, as Associate Professor of History Eric Cunningham details in an article published Monday, Oct. 7, on the 1887 Trust website ("Mission-Centered Hiring" Does Not Mean Catholic Hiring), Gonzaga today does not note the religious affiliation of any of its professors. GU literally cannot tell whether it is in compliance with Ex Corde's mandate.

Why does GU ignore this key component of Ex Corde? Whether because of an overabundance of caution in regard to EEO guidelines, from which Gonzaga should be exempt as a religious institution, or because, as some have privately suggested, GU's search committees are often actually hostile to the hiring of faithful Catholics, the University is flouting a major Ex Corde directive.

Not all prominent universities are resistant to a majority Catholic faculty; University of Notre Dame's mission statement, for instance, includes this: "The Catholic identity of the University depends upon, and is nurtured by, the continuing presence of a predominant number of Catholic intellectuals."

George M. Marsden's "The Soul of the American University" demonstrated that the battles for the religious identities of educational institutions are won and lost at the faculty level. Without a majority of faithful Catholics on the faculty, GU will inevitably lose its Catholic character.

GU's administration and board of trustees must commit Gonzaga to fidelity to its claim to be Catholic. One manifestation of that claim should be an embrace of Ex Corde's mandate of a majority Catholic faculty. 1887 Trust urges a 65 percent Catholic faculty hiring target in order to begin to make up lost ground and to allow for Catholic

faculty hires who might be less than fully engaged by GU's Catholic mission. To save its Catholic character for future generations, GU must acquire and maintain a majority Catholic faculty.

Jim Infantine is president of 1887 Trust, a nonprofit organization of alumni, parents and other stakeholders in the Gonzaga University community committed to preserving Gonzaga's Catholic identity.